The Durham Juris

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA,

In August of 2015, Kendrick Gregory embarked upon an increasingly violent streak of horrific crimes over the course of two days.^{^[1]} He stole two vehicles and then proceeded to rob and murder two innocent people.^{^[2]} He then kidnapped and raped a fifteen year old girl whom he had stalked the day earlier.^{^[3]} After an additional armed robbery, Gregory fled to New York City in a stolen car, but was ultimately arrested and extradited to North Carolina to stand trial.^{^[4]}

In the eight months prior to these events, Gregory attempted to admit himself for psychiatric treatment a total of twenty times, citing suicidal ideation and voices compelling him to kill.^{^[5]} Further, Gregory had ceased taking antipsychotic medication at the time of the events. Wake County Jail, unable to provide for his mental health needs, requested that Gregory be transferred to somewhere with more robust health accommodations.^{^[6]} He ended up in Central Regional Hospital, where the question remained as to whether or not he was capable of standing trial.

Dr. Nicole Wolfe, a forensic psychologist at Central Regional Hospital, evaluated Gregory three times between 2017 and 2020.^{^[7]} On both occasions where Gregory was unmedicated, Dr. Wolfe determined that he suffered from an array of psychological disorders and was mentally unfit to stand for trial. However, during one evaluation in 2018 where Gregory had voluntarily taken his medication, Dr. Wolfe opined that he was stable enough to stand trial.^{^[8]}

Thus, in 2020, the State moved to have Gregory forcefully medicated in order to render him capable of standing trial.^{^[9]} In order to mandate the involuntary administration of drugs, the trial court must hold a hearing, known as a Sell hearing, in which they must prove that the proposed plan is the only means to restore the competence of the defendant^{^[10]}. In this hearing, Dr. Wolfe was called as an expert witness for the State, testifying that Gregory was “not going to spontaneously improve without treatment”.^{^[11]}

Further, Wolfe contended that the absence of medication can have other ramifications, stating that “psychotic people do unpredictable actions, and sometimes that’s dangerousness to self or others”.^{^[12]} Wolfe later stated in the same testimony that untreated psychosis, can lead to suicide or aggression against others. The State also introduced a second expert witness who admitted that Gregory would occasionally malinger, or exaggerate his symptoms, but ultimately affirmed Dr. Wolfe’s assessment of his mental competency. Dr. Wolf never made mention of malingering in her testimony.

Eventually, Gregory began voluntarily taking antipsychotic medication, making the rest of the Sell trial unnecessary. With this development, he was competent enough to stand trial in 2020. Gregory pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, arguing that at the time of the crimes he was unable to discern between right and wrong. Therefore, the State had only to prove whether Gregory was capable of understanding his actions as he perpetrated them. Gregory produced two expert witnesses that testified to the severity of his Schizoaffective disorder, concluding that the many reality-altering facets of his condition rendered him unaccountable for his actions.

In this trial, the State once again introduced Dr. Wolfe as their primary expert witness on Gregory’s mental condition. However, unlike in the Sell trial, Dr. Wolfe testified that Gregory was a habitual malingerer, repeatedly feigning symptoms for personal gain^{^[13]}. Although she maintained that Gregory had not been fit for trial during the interviews in which he was unmedicated, her final opinion was that Gregory possessed self agency during the crimes, understanding the error of his actions irregardless of his mental illness.

While cross-examining Dr. Wolfe, the defence inquired about her seemingly contradictory prior testimony regarding Gregory’s fitness for trial. When the defence went to explain the context behind her statements, the trial court sustained an objection from the State, agreeing that the line of questioning would unfairly mislead the jury^{^[14]}. Thus, the defense was allowed to question Dr. Wolfe regarding her past testimony, but was barred from mentioning “a Sell hearing or any forcible injections”^{^[15]}. Although the defence did inform the jury through cross-examination that Dr. Wolfe previously suggested Gregory was incompetent to stand trial, they were unable to inform the jury of the context within which those statements were made (the suggestion of forced medication).

Before the jury’s verdict, the court decided that a statement regarding the process for insanity pleas should be read to the jury. The defence motioned to add an additional paragraph to the standard language, emphasizing how difficult it is to be released from facilities after an insanity verdict^{^[16]}. After the prosecution signaled that they would not mislead the jury as to the length of Gregory’s potential commitment, the trial court denied the defence’s request to give this special instruction.

Gregory was sentenced to life in prison with additional sentences of up to 800 months in prison^{^[17]}. The defence appealed, arguing that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause^{^[18]} by limiting their cross-examination of Dr. Wolfe. They also argued that the court erred in rejecting their request for special jury instruction, claiming that the statement as read was incomplete or misleading. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in either case, with Judge Hampson dissenting. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed with the Court of Appeals. Only Justices Riggs and Earls dissented.

The principles at work in this case have a storied history. A test for criminal insanity was codified into British common law in 1843 during the case against Daniel M’Naghten.^{^[19]} M’Naghten attempted to assassinate the prime minister, Robert Peel, but killed his secretary instead. After being found not guilty due to his mental state, M’Naghten was sentenced to an asylum for the rest of his life. The direct result of the case was the M’Naghten rule, asserting that a defendant is presumed sane unless they prove that they either had no awareness of their actions or no understanding of wrongdoing during the alleged crime.^{^[20]} This test would become the standard in both the UK and much of the U.S, including North Carolina.^{^[21]}

There is a longstanding legal history of insanity cases in the United States. The defense has been used to varying success, but has found a recurring home among political assassination attempts. One of the earliest of such cases was that of Richard Lawrence, who misfired two pistols at Andrew Jackson’s back^{^[22]}. Francis Scott Key – famous for penning “Defence of Fort M’Henry”, which would later become the national anthem – served as the prosecutor. Lawrence was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and would spend the remainder of his life in an asylum.

Ironically, Key’s son, Philip Barton Key Ⅱ, wound up on the opposite end of the insanity plea. Phillop Key, then the United States attorney for Washington D.C, began an affair with Daniel Sickles’ wife. Sickles, a representative from New York, retaliated by gunning down an unarmed Key in broad daylight, and in full view of the White House.^{^[23]} Sickles mounted the first temporary insanity case in U.S history, arguing his crime of passion had only momentarily restrained his judgment.^{^[24]} After being acquitted, Sickles served as a Major General during the Civil War, winning the medal of honor for losing his leg at Gettysburg.^{^[25]} His leg is still a popular display piece at the National Museum of Health and Medicine^{^[26]}.

In State v. Gregory, the matter at hand was not the factual basis of the crime, but rather the defendant’s culpability for his own actions. Essentially, the sole argument of the defense rested upon Gregory not meeting the legal standard for insanity. Over the course of their deliberation, the jury asked for clarification on precise definitions several times.^{^[27]} Particularly, they asked repeatedly for more clarity on what qualifies the “nature and quality” of an action.^{^[28]} Clearly, challenging Dr. Wolfe’s testimony was imperative for the defence’s case.

Justice Riggs’ dissent cites the hung jury and the importance of Dr. Wolfe’s testimony as evidence of the need for constitutional redress. This seems to suggest that the lower court’s decision was especially erroneous because “there is a reasonable possibility that the motivation for Dr. Wolfe’s testimony at the Sell hearing, had it been offered, would have led the jury to a different result”.^{^[29]}

However, this analysis oversteps the court’s authority and misconstrues the principle of constitutional redress. While a dissent is not directly codified into law, its contents must uphold the same standard as the majority it critiques. It is certainly within the scope of this case to remark upon the significance of Dr. Wolfe’s testimony or the fiercity of the jury’s deliberation, but they simply cannot be offered as evidence against the lower court’s decision. The dissent’s conclusion must be purely contingent upon analysis of the Confrontation Clause, as is Judge Hampson’s dissent in the lower court. Constitutional error is constitutional error. It is irrelevant whether the precedent established by redress of that even applies to the current case.

The duty of the court is to provide an interpretation of the law, not to be drawn into hypotheticals regarding the potential outcome of a case. That being said, the importance of Dr. Wolfe’s testimony is certainly relevant in illustrating the severity of constitutional wrongdoing. Considering that questioning Dr. Wolfe’s veracity is central to the case, the court exercises a great deal of power in limiting access to her testimony from the defence, and thus the jury.

But was that limitation actually a violation of the Confrontation Clause? The 6th amendment of the Federal constitution protects the right of those in criminal prosecutions to “be confronted with the witnesses against him”.^{^[30]} The tradition of judicial confrontation has been practiced since antiquity. In the New Testament, Festus told Paul that “it is not the custom of the Romans to give up any man, before that the accused have the accusers face to face, and have had opportunity to make his defence concerning the matter laid against him”.^{^[31]} When Charles Ⅰ was held in contempt of court during his trial, the tribunal simply introduced witnesses and evidence in his absence rather than proceeding with summary execution, depriving him of his right to confrontation.^{^[32]}

Confrontation of witnesses is the principle means through which a party in court can challenge presented evidence. Therefore, it is a non-negotiable step in the process of discerning truth and delivering justice. The 6th amendment specifically codifies the right of confrontation that had previously originated from English common law. Confrontation is listed among the most fundamental rights of accused parties, including the right to counsel itself.^{^[33]} Early interpretation of the Confrontation Clause accordingly saw it as an extension of inherited trial rights.^{^[34]}

However, the Supreme Court would later narrow the application of the Confrontation Clause. For example, they allowed the admission of dying declarations as evidence, despite the fact that their orator could no longer be interrogated for the intent behind their words. The Confrontation Clause was selectively incorporated to the states via the 14th amendment in 1965, and the court grappled with the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the ban on hearsay evidence. With Ohio v. Roberts in 1980, the court ruled that hearsay evidence could be admitted if their speaker could not testify at trial, but only if there was an inferred trustworthiness to the statements.

In 2004, the landmark Crawford v. Washington once again altered the standard for whether a hearsay statement is in violation of the Confrontation Clause.^{^[35]} Crawford’s wife led him to the apartment of a man who allegedly had attempted to rape her. After a confrontation, Crawford stabbed the man, claiming self defence. During the trial, the prosecution played a tape of Crawford’s wife calling the police that contradicted his claim of self defence. Because of Washington State’s marital privilege rules, Crawford’s wife could not testify in court and thus could not be cross-examined. Crawford alleged that his right to confrontation had been violated since he was barred from challenging the testimony heard in a pre recorded statement.

In ruling that they “reject the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony”, the Supreme Court interpreted that any act of “testimony” could be considered a violation of the Confrontation Clause.^{^[36]} Given that interrogations with police are testimonial, the court sided with Crawford, setting the precedent that any piece of testimony, regardless of its origin, could not be admitted if both parties did not have the opportunity to confront that witness. This overturned the precedent from Roberts that evaluated out of court statements by their reliability rather than testimonial nature. Under this new standard, testimony from a witness who is unavailable at trial is only admissible if there is an opportunity to question the witness before trial.

Within the context of Gregory, the controversy concerns testimony delivered during a Sell trial. In 1997, the court ruled in Sell v. United States that antipsychotic medication can be involuntarily administered to a criminal defendant only if “the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests”.^{^[37]} This language, building off the framework of Riggins v. Nevada, implies that involuntary medication must originate only from an essential interest of the State.^{^[38]} Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the result of a Sell trial itself, or the context within which it was held, represents evidence as to the mental state of the defendant.

The Court of Appeals argued that because the jury was aware that Gregory was unmedicated while committing the crimes, Dr. Wolfe considered him unfit for trial during several interviews, Dr. Wolfe prescribed Gregory medication, and Dr. Wolfe considered this medication necessary for him to continue to trial, there was no substantial limitation upon Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that would have prevented the defence from attacking her credibility.^{^[39]} Further, if this limitation would provide such a hurdle, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Trial Court’s reasoning that the line of questioning regarding the Sell trial had its merit outweighed by the danger it represented in misleading or confusing the jury.

This line of reasoning is fundamentally flawed. If knowledge of a Sell trial’s purpose would prejudicially sway a jury’s perception of a defendant, then the trial itself should be outside the scope of the law. The purpose of a procedure shall not be concealed from a jury lest the procedure itself is prejudicial. As Justice Riggs states in her dissent, “The State cannot pretend that a mechanism of which it avails itself is somehow so emotionally troubling to a jury that the State and the court have to pretend that such a mechanism does not exist”.^{^[40]}

Further, Dr. Wolfe’s testimony must be examined within the context in which it was provided. Dr. Wolfe can be attacked as a witness even without the context of a Sell trial, but there is a stark difference between stating a client cannot go to trial without medication, and testifying that the State has no other option than to forcefully medicate a defendant. Without the knowledge of a Sell trial, the jury is barred from the fact that Dr. Wolfe’s testimony changed not only with new evidence, but with new contexts. If the defence is unable to explicate how the settings of Dr. Wolfe’s testimonies are inherently contradictory, then they are effectively deprived of their right to confront the witness against them. As such, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina erred in their reasoning, and Gregory is entitled to a new trial.

The right to confrontation is as essential as the right to counsel. Infringing upon the confrontation clause is an attack upon the rest of the 6th amendment: a restriction upon a defendant’s right to legal representation. The purpose of training lawyers is to preserve the sanctity of a thorough, fair judicial process. Unduly restricting a party’s access to evidence in the form of witness testimony is antithetical to the pursuit of justice. This does not imply that the defence has the right to emotionally manipulate a jury, but must any not-guilty verdict arise from some sympathy for the defendant? Trying to remove emotion from the jury room is impossible, and in trying to do so the court actually limited the jury’s ability to rationally analyze testimony.

The Confrontation Clause is a robust constitutional codification of the rules of evidence established in English common law. A broad interpretation of what evidence it applies to, as seen in Crawford, is essential for protecting the right of both parties to question the authority of alternative viewpoints. It is ultimately up to the jury to take disparate perspectives and arrange them into a verdict. Depriving the jury of the context behind one of these testimonies will only result in an incomplete picture. As this choice in State v. Gregory violates both the current interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and the judicial principles it represents, there must be judicial redress for the defendant.

REVERSED

^{State v. Gregory,}^{___ N.C ___ (March 21, 2025)} ↑
^Id. ↑
^Id. ↑
^Id. ↑
^Id. ↑
^Id. ↑
^{State v. Gregory,}^{291 N.C App. 617 (2023)} ↑
^Id. ↑
^Id. ↑
^{Sell v. United States,}^{539 U.S 166 (2003)} ↑
^Gregory,^{291 N.C App. 617 (2023)} ↑
^{Id. at 620} ↑
^{Id. at 621} ↑
^{Id. at 622} ↑
^Id. ↑
^{Id. at 624} ↑
^{Id. at 618} ↑
^{U.S Const. amend. ⅤⅠ} ↑
^{M’naghten rule, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/m%27naghten_rule} ↑
^Id. ↑
^{Dillard S. Gardner, Insanity as a Defence in the North Carolina Criminal Law, 30 N.C. L. Rev. 4 (1951)} ↑
^{The Attempt to Kill “King Andrew”, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Attempt_to_kill_King_Andrew.htm} ↑
^{Daniel E. Sickles, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/daniel-e-sickles} ↑
^{Murder in Lafayette Square, https://blogs.loc.gov/headlinesandheroes/2022/09/murder-in-lafayette-square/} ↑
^{Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles: His Contribution to the Army Medical Museum, https://medicalmuseum.health.mil/micrograph/index.cfm/posts/2021/maj_gen_daniel_e_sickles} ↑
^{This story, as is typical of many 19th century historical giants, carries yet more intersections with history. Sickles’ defense attorney was Edward Stanton, who later served as Lincoln’s secretary of war and had a major role in Andrew Johnson’s impeachment.} ↑
^Gregory,^{___ N.C ___ (March 21, 2025)} ↑
^Id. ↑
^Id. ↑
^{U.S Const. amend. VI} ↑
^Acts^25:16 ↑
^{Sentence Of The High Court of Justice Upon Charles I, https://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/charlesIlinks.html} ↑
^{U.S Const. amend. VI} ↑
^{Early Confrontation Clause Cases, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt6-5-1/ALDE_00000944/} ↑
^{Crawford v. Washington,}^{541 US 36 (2004)} ↑
^Id. ↑
^Sell,^{539 U.S 166 (2003)} ↑
^{Riggins v. Nevada,}^{504 US 127 (1992)} ↑
^Gregory,^{291 N.C App. 617 (2023)} ↑
^Gregory,^{___ N.C ___ (March 21, 2025)} ↑